NebuSec bypasses Telegram patch, publishes hardened widget runtime design
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NebuSec says it bypassed Telegram's seccomp filter two days after the Nov. 12 patch, following a Nov. 11 demonstration that a bot-supplied widget could achieve remote code execution in Telegram for Android. The firm attributes the gap to a denylist seccomp policy, a single shared process for all widgets and no confinement of QuickJS. In response, NebuSec published a hardened runtime design that runs widget JavaScript in an Android isolated service, compiles QuickJS to WebAssembly via wasm2c for software fault isolation, and uses RLBox to treat engine output as untrusted until the host validates it. NebuSec says the architecture is "by no means a guarantee of security," and that it again achieved arbitrary code execution by exploiting a Skia vulnerability. It says it is withholding details of further variants for now.
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- Hacker News · AINebuSec on Telegram's RCE: Hardening a JavaScript Widget Runtime
NebuSec says it bypassed Telegram's seccomp filter two days after the Nov. 12 patch, following the Nov. 11 demonstration that a bot-supplied widget could achieve remote code execution in Telegram for Android. The post attributes the gap to a denylist seccomp policy, a single shared process for all widgets and no confinement of QuickJS, and presents a hardened runtime that runs widget JavaScript in an Android isolated service, compiles QuickJS to WebAssembly via wasm2c for software fault isolation, and uses RLBox to mark engine output as untrusted until the host validates it.
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