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  1. Goodfire Research62

    Goodfire studies Qwen3.6-35B-A3B neurons as an interpretable basis

    Goodfire Research published a study arguing that individual MLP neurons in Qwen3.6-35B-A3B are more interpretable than assumed, based on sparsification, attribution tools and research agents. Ablating the 92.2% weakest MoE neuron activations per forward pass raised language model loss by only 2.9%, and 69% of neuron poles had a single mode responsible for at least 90% of their causal effect. Natural-language neuron descriptions let a judge model predict firing with 95% accuracy against random text and recover 73% of ablation damage through simulation.

    Why it matters: Goodfire's study of Qwen3.6-35B-A3B neurons argues that strong activations alone carry most of the model's computation, offering a concrete alternative to feature-dictionary interpretability.

  1. Epoch AI · Gradient Updates82

    Epoch AI finds GLM 5.3 can turn published Firefox fixes into working exploits before users update

    Epoch AI reports that GLM 5.3, an open-weight model released by Z.ai in August, autonomously built working exploits from Mozilla security fixes that had been published but not yet shipped to users, compromising all six Firefox versions released between September 17 and October 26. After roughly $100,000 in setup and API costs, each successful attack cost about $1,000 in compute, and the fastest attempt took 12 hours within a 48-hour budget. Similar attacks on Chrome did not succeed, and the researchers say no provider safeguards or refusals were triggered; a separate unpublished vulnerability they found was patched in the October 27 Firefox 159.0 release.

    Why it matters: Epoch AI's experiment shows an open-weight model autonomously weaponizing published-but-unshipped Firefox fixes, putting a concrete cost and time figure on the patch gap.

  1. Goodfire Research71

    Goodfire trains and deploys probe-based cyber misuse monitors on Kimi K3 and GLM 5.3

    3 and deployed them on a production inference stack, where a cheap probe filters turns and only suspicious exchanges reach an LLM judge. 5% benign-session interruption rate, costs $65 per million turns without judge reasoning and $185 with it, and adds no measurable throughput loss inside SGLang.

    Why it matters: Goodfire shows a probe-plus-judge cascade can monitor agentic cyber misuse at roughly 50x lower cost with no measurable throughput loss, a concrete recipe for serving open models safely.

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